劳动和社会保障部、信息产业部


关于实施电子信息产业高技能人才培训项目的通知

各省、自治区、直辖市劳动和社会保障厅（局）、信息产业厅（局）：

为加快电子信息产业高技能人才队伍的建设，根据劳动和社会保障部实施国家高技能人
才培训工程的总体安排，劳动和社会保障部与信息产业部决定联合实施电子信息产业高技能
人才培训项目（以下简称培训项目），现就有关事项通知如下：

一、任务目标

根据《国民经济和社会发展第十个五年计划信息化重点专项规划》和电子信息产业发展
的需要，按照需求定向、企业主导、条块结合、政府帮助的原则，从2003年10月—2006年
底，在部分电子信息产业较为集中的城市和重点企业集团中，加强高级技术工人培养，表彰
奖励一批拔尖技术能手，形成培养快、使用好、待遇高的机制，形成争学技术，争当能手的
社会氛围，力争使高级工、技师和高级技师数量有较大增加，在技术工人中所占的比重提高
3~5个百分点，缓解电子信息产业高技能人才短缺的状况，为电子信息产业发展提供技能人
才支持。

二、实施范围

（一）重点联系城市：先确定北京、天津、上海、广州、深圳、沈阳、大连、南京、杭
州、苏州、福州、济南、长沙、成都、西安、哈尔滨、长春、厦门、石家庄、青岛等20个城
市为本项目重点联系城市。

（二）重点联系企业：先确定中国普天信息产业集团、中国电子科技集团公司、中国电
子信息产业集团公司、TCL集团公司、海信集团有限公司、彩虹电子集团公司、华为技术有
限公司、中兴通讯股份有限公司、熊猫电子集团有限公司、四川长虹电器股份有限公司等大
型企业集团公司为本培训项目重点联系企业。

（三）重点职业领域：在IT企业中从事电真空制造、半导体芯片制造、电子电路制造、
通信设备制造、电池制造、无线电整机装配调试、雷达装配调试、电子设备维修、电子产品
模具制造、计算机（含外设）服务器装配调试、维修、计算机系统集成等职业的技能人才，
以及软件开发、信息服务、计算机信息系统操作人员。

（四）各省（自治区、直辖市）劳动保障部门、信息产业部门可根据本地区电子信息产
业发展实际需求，确定实施本培训项目的具体方案。

三、主要内容

（一）选择规模较大、技术设备先进、管理规范、效益较好和具有优势教育培训资源的
企业，建立“国家高技能人才培训工程（电子信息项目）培训基地”。依托培训基地开展高
技能人才培训。除确定10家重点联系企业建立培训基地外，每个联系城市各确定企业培训基
地1-2家，各省（自治区、直辖市）可根据本地区实际确定企业培训基地1-2家，由劳动和社
会保障部与信息产业部统一公布。企业要结合本企业发展，充分发挥培训基地的示范和辐射
作用，开展以下高技能人才培养工作：

1．通过多种培训形式，实施高级工、技师、高级技师职业资格培训和“四新”技术技
能培训、技能提高培训等；

2．组织岗位练兵、技能竞赛，同业交流和绝招绝技观摩活动等，表彰奖励技术能手和
做出突出贡献的技能人才；

3．发挥培训资源优势，承担中小企业职工培训任务，为培训机构提供兼职教师、实习
场所和设备。

（二）选择专业实习设备先进、师资力量强的电子信息类职业院校和普通高等院校，建
立“国家高技能人才培训工程（电子信息项目）培训基地”。面向企业和社会开展高技能人
才培训。每个联系城市各确定学校培训基地1-2家，各省（自治区、直辖市）可根据本地区
实际确定学校培训基地1-2家，由劳动和社会保障部和信息产业部统一公布。学校培训基地
要结合当地高技能人才需求，开展以下工作：

1．招收技工学校、中等职业学校毕业生和具备条件的中级技术工人，开展高级技工学制
教育。

2．面向社会开展企业在职职工和下岗失业人员、劳动力市场求职人员的高级工、技师和
高级技师职业资格培训。

3．面向高职院校和普通高等院校毕业生中尚未就业的人员开展技能强化训练。

（三）信息产业部电子行业职业技能鉴定指导中心联合有关职业教育培训机构，建立国
家高技能人才（电子信息项目）培训工程资源开发中心。资源开发中心要围绕项目的实施，
承担以下工作：

1.跟踪了解新技术、新技能的推广应用情况。
2.开发培训课程，开展师范性培训。
3.组织培训方法研究，承担教材开发和骨干师资培训工作。

（四）逐步完善电子信息产业特有职业国家职业标准制定、教材编写、试题库开发等基础
工作。依据《国家职业标准》和企业生产岗位规范的要求制定培训教学计划，并根据新技术、
新工艺、新设备、新材料的发展，进行动态调整。开发和出版一批体现信息产业高技能人才培
养特色的教材。在技术上确保高技能人才培训工程的顺利进行。

（五）组织实施电子信息技术远程培训。根据技术发展和企业需求，陆续开展计算机应用
与软件开发、信息服务等领域的远程培训项目。

（六）大力推行职业资格证书制度。企业和学校基地完成重点职业的培训任务后，信息产
业特有职业（工种）由信息产业部电子行业职业技能鉴定指导中心组织实施鉴定，信息产业部
劳资部门按照规定核发相应的职业资格证书。通用职业（工种）由劳动保障部门组织实施鉴定，
核发相应职业资格证书。加大技师考评工作力度，原则上每年组织一次技师资格考评，考评合
格颁发职业资格证书。

（七）从2004年开始，每两年组织一次电子行业特有职业的职业技能竞赛，鼓励岗位练兵
活动，对大赛和岗位练兵活动中涌现出来的优秀人才进行表彰、鼓励优秀人才脱颖而出。

四、组织推动

（一）由劳动和社会保障部、信息产业部共同成立全国电子信息高技能人才培训项目工作
领导小组（见附件），负责项目的组织领导，统筹协调和进行重大问题的决策。领导小组下设
全国电子信息高技能人才培训项目工作办公室，负责培训项目的日常工作，办公室设在信息产
业部。

（二）实施本项目的省（自治区、直辖市）和联系城市成立由劳动保障部门和信息产业部
门和企业组成的领导小组，负责本地区项目的统筹规划和组织实施工作，并做好企业和学校的
沟通联系工作。

（三）重点联系企业（国家培训基地所在企业）要成立或落实相应工作机构，推动培训项
目的实施。

重点联系企业要制定本单位高技能人才培养规划，建立企业职工培训、考核、使用、待遇
相统一的政策。提高高级工、技师、高级技师的工资水平、岗位津贴和福利待遇，形成多种形
式的有利于高级技能人才成长的激励机制。

五、实施步骤

（一）启动阶段（2003年11月底前）

1．实施本培训项目的省（自治区、直辖市）和重点联系城市、企业成立或落实培训项目
领导机构和实施机构。
2．调研了解地区、行业、企业的需求，制定实施方案。
3．确定企业和学校培训基地。
4．陆续开始编写教材，开发课件，开展师资培训。

（二）实施阶段（2003年12月—2006年9月）
1．组织实施培训。
2．做好基础工作和技术支持。
3．进行阶段性总结，推广工作经验。

（三）效果评估（2006年10—12月）
1．各省（自治区、直辖市）和重点联系城市及企业自行评估。
2．劳动保障部和信息产业部组织检查评估。
3．培训项目总结。

附件：全国电子信息产业高技能人才培训项目领导小组名单

二○○三年九月二十九日
附件

全国电子信息产业高技能人才
培训项目领导小组名单

组长： 张小建 劳动和社会保障部副部长
苟仲文 信息产业部副部长

成员： 于法鸣 劳动保障部培训就业司司长
刘 康 劳动保障部培训就业司副司长
王耀光 信息产业部人事司副司长
陈 宇 中国就业培训技术指导中心主任
张 勇 信息产业部人事司处长
周 健 信息产业部科学技术司处长
周 明 电子行业职业技能鉴定指导中心副主任
徐玉彬 信息产业部电子教育中心副主任
左志成 中国电子科技集团公司人力资源部主任
尹铁如 中国电子信息集团公司人力资源部主任
仉兴喜 彩虹集团公司人力资源部部长
刘建军 中国普天信息产业集团公司人力资源部副总经理




The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.